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At the beginning of the 1940s, Southeast Asia’s six main countries of 
Burma, Thailand, Malaya (including Singapore), Indonesia, Indochina and the 
Philippines were thought by many infl uential Japanese strategists and planners 
to hold a treasure trove of resources.  The expectation was that, after Japan 
gained control of Southeast Asia in May 1942, the region would now contribute 
this wealth of resources to the war effort.  In reality, Japan gained little from 
Southeast Asia apart from oil, bauxite and some rice.  Nor was Southeast 
Asia able, even for its own self-sufficiency, to provide much in the way of 
manufactured goods.
A well-known reason for the paucity of the Southeast Asian contribution 
was Japan’s shortage of shipping which hindered, and by the spring of 1945 
almost entirely prevented, the transport of goods back to Japan.  Even at the 
start of the war in December 1941 Japan’s merchant fleet was too small to 
meet the needs of the home economy as well as the logistic requirements of her 
forces in the Pacifi c.2  By mid-1943, shipping availability began dramatically to 
worsen due to heavy losses infl icted on Japan’s merchant fl eet.
Two further reasons for a lack of goods obtained from Southeast Asia 
are less appreciated than the problem of shipping.  One is that Southeast 
Asia consisted of a collection of mono-economies highly specialized in the 




All these commodities were produced in far greater quantities than Japan could 
use.
The second consideration is how remarkably little industrialized Southeast 
Asia was.  In 1941, none of its six countries even remotely approached self-
suffi ciency in textiles; all relied on selling to the world market the commodities 
in which they specialized and using the proceeds to buy nearly all basic 
consumer goods and medicines.
In wartime Southeast Asia, strong incentives to manufacture local 
substitutes for previously imported goods resulted from shortages, a falling 
availability of rationed items and spiralling prices.  Japanese military policy 
to achieve self-suffi ciency wherever possible provided a yet further impetus to 
import substitution industrialization.  So too, did the combination of Japan’s 
unwillingness and, in a war-stretched home economy inability, to send goods to 
counter supply shortfalls.
Nevertheless, new wartime Southeast Asian industrialization was slight 
even when its instigators were Japanese and its chief purpose was to support 
the war effort.  Raw material inputs and the capital goods needed to set up 
import substitution industries were often lacking because they had previously 
come as imports and were unobtainable under wartime conditions.  When this 
was not a constraint, the region’s minimal pre-war production of even simple 
manufactured goods and consequent lack of an industrial heritage constituted 
a major barrier to industrialization.  A Southeast Asian industrial platform of 
engineers, technicians and skilled labour was woefully inadequate to launch any 
substantial new industry.
Limited import substitution and restricted imports of raw and manufactured 
materials left Japanese and Southeast Asians alike often reliant on imperfect, 




the extent of wartime scarcity in Southeast Asia’s war-affected economy and 
some of the substitutes that were devised to try to counter this.  Analysis shows 
the ingenuity of occupiers and occupied alike in adapting materials at hand.
Substitutes
Three features are apparent in much of the substitution in Southeast 
Asia.  First, substitutes were frequently poor replacements for unavailable 
goods.  Second, the production of substitutes was often highly labour 
intensive and could require, even for commodities in extreme surplus like 
rubber, unrealistically large amounts of locally available raw materials. 
While this partly reflected the low cost of labour and large oversupply of a 
few commodities, it was also explained by limited industrial machinery and 
technical knowledge in pre-war Southeast Asia.  Third, Southeast Asians and 
Japanese alike, constrained by near-total autarkic economies, had to make do 
with on-the-spot materials.  The range of these was quite narrow.  That helps 
to account for the use across Southeast Asia of different inputs to produce 
substitutes for the same good.
Of the numerous items that were essential but difficult or impossible to 
obtain petroleum products, including petrol, lubricants and kerosene, and 
textiles were the most important.  Petroleum shortages reduced GDP through 
constraining economic activity, plagued the Japanese military, and affected 
almost all Southeast Asians by restricting the transport of goods for civilians. 
Textile shortages, chiefly reflected in a lack of clothing and thread to repair 
it, were less serious for the military than for civilians.  The military could 
requisition whatever textiles were available; few civilians wove their own 




on rations.  By the latter part of the war, the chance of obtaining textiles from 
either of these sources was, for the majority of Southeast Asians, almost nil. 
The general Singapore ration in early 1944 for cotton textiles of one yard per 
person per year was, as a Japanese research report observed, ‘so small that it is 
virtually useless’.3  In Manila, a wholly inadequate textile ration led to a brisk 
business in old clothes.  Clothing marts appeared at Bambang Street in Sta. 
Cruz and Dart Street in Pakò.4  Rugs and scrap cloth were collected in Indonesia 
to make clothing.5
Other basic items in acute shortage nearly everywhere included soap, 
matches, cigarettes, paper and medicines.  In Malaya, a tobacco industry 
mushroomed overnight into a ‘considerable undertaking’ to replace pre-war 
cigarette imports.6  Matches, however, were not easily made because good 
substitutes for chlorate of potash and other chemicals important in match 
manufacture had previously been imported and were unavailable locally.7  In 
the Philippines, where chemicals had been imported from Sweden, splitting 
matches in half economized on their use.  As this required some skill, others 
made a wicker lamp from a tin can fi lled with coconut oil or, in the provinces, 
went back to the fl int-and-tinder of earlier times.8  
The range of locally available materials with which to produce substitutes 
was sharply limited by Southeast Asia’s mono-economies; by a lack of 
appropriate machinery; and by an inability to import intermediate inputs 
fundamental to the production of fi nal goods.  Materials which found the most 
varied use in making substitutes frequently corresponded to the main Southeast 
Asian exports.  There was, however, a premium on improvisation with whatever 
could be found, as in Malaya where spoons and forks were fashioned out of 
sheet aluminium salvaged from the wreckage of downed Zeros and Flying 




Singapore traders and speculators had the metal turned into spoons.  These 
were used in coffee shops and private homes.10  Guerrilla forces, operative in 
much of the Philippines, found numerous ways to adapt and innovate.  One unit 
in Leyte had to compensate for the lack of a printing press, printing papers and 
ink with which to print their own currency.  They utilized wooden blocks made 
by local engravers and ink concocted by a resident chemist, and printed on 
wrapping paper, grade three notebook paper or whatever other paper could be 
salvaged.11
Substitution for metals, all in chronic shortage, was particularly difficult 
due to a lack of capital equipment.  Scrap metal of any sort became valuable 
and existing structures were cannibalized.   By September 1943, large numbers 
of homeowners in Manila had begun to tear down their dwellings in response 
to high prices for galvanized iron, roofing nails, lumber and other building 
materials.12  In Malaya, Japanese firms turned old barbed wire and wire-
ropes into wire-nails of up to three inches long for trade-packing and light 
construction work.13
The inputs most commonly used by Japanese and local industries to create 
substitutes were rubber, rice, sugar, copra, pineapples and some tropical plants. 
In Malaya and also Burma, oil extracted from rubber was a common petrol 
substitute but had the disadvantages of yielding less power than petrol, emitting 
a foul smell when burned, and soon clogging engines.14  While rubber oil alone 
worked poorly as a fuel, mixing it with benzene improved performance.15
Nor was gasoline efficiently made from rubber.  Before the war, Malaya 
consumed 83,000 tons of gasoline.  Fully to replace this volume would have 
required 1.7m tons of rubber, three times Malaya’s normal yearly production, as 
well as building many more liquefaction factories.16  Singapore traders carried 




market, to Thailand where it could be exchanged for rice.  Several Japanese 
factories in Malaya made rubber oil as did some Indochinese enterprises.17
Rubber was, however, just one of many possible fuel substitutes.  Taxis 
in Singapore ran on charcoal.18  So too did some cars in Indochina, possibly 
mixing anthracite with charcoal to improve performance.19  Charcoal, when 
made from mangrove as in Malaya, yielded a fuel hot enough to make pig iron 
assaying at 70% to 78%.20  In Burma, petrol was manufactured from the sap of 
kanyin trees and from rice, as well as from rubber.21  The Philippines produced 
no oil and beginning in August 1942, buses fuelled by coconut-charcoal were 
introduced in Manila.22  Motorized transport in Indochina depended chiefly 
on fuel distilled from rice; cane sugar grown in the Philippines was used to 
try to mimic high-grade fuel and also to produce paper.23  Motorized transport 
in Indochina depended chiefl y on the distillation of rice for fuel.  Chemists in 
Indochina concocted rice, maize or sugar into a substitute for aviation fuel, 
although one with octane levels that only allowed airplanes to operate at 
relatively slow speeds.24  By contrast, sugar was scarce in Malaya and people 
began profi table businesses in tapping the alcoholic drink sweet toddy to obtain 
it as food.25  A kerosene replacement in Indochina consisted of a mixture of oils 
derived from fi sh, copra and groundnuts.26
During the later stages of occupation, growing shortages of lubricants 
hindered raw material processing and industrial production by causing 
machines to seize up.  Heated cotton seed oil substituted as a lubricant in the 
Philippines.  In Indochina, lubricants were derived from local vegetable oils.27 
Crude red palm oil, mixed with foreign-made oils and greases to add strength, 
was used by Malayan mines, factories and transport workshops.28  At the 
beginning of 1944, castor oil plants were grown along Indonesian roadsides and 




Rubber found a number of uses apart from providing a raw material for 
fuel oil.  None could absorb more than an insignifi cant amount of the surpluses 
piling up in Southeast Asia’s rubber-growing regions, even though rubber was a 
principal material incorporated in the manufacture of rubber boats, horseshoes, 
canteens, rice cookers and asphalt substitutes intended for airport runway and 
other surfaces.  In Burma, Japanese technicians made rubber into a leather 
substitute for belts and bayonet, cartridge, signal lantern cases.  Because of a 
lack of gunnies part-rubber bags were used to transport rice and all-rubber bags 
to carry mineral oils.30  A lack of equipment to manufacture inner tubes led to 
the appearance of solid rubber tyres on cars and bicycles although wood tyres 
might have to make do in areas where rubber was not in surplus.31
Gunny sacks, although in short supply for shipping rice or sugar, were the 
most usual Southeast Asian cloth substitute, despite the drawbacks of itching 
badly and harbouring lice.  In Java, shorts made from gunny cloth were a prize 
for the delivery of 15 rat tails.32  Some Burmese complemented gunnies with 
jackets of mosquito netting.33  Clothing substitutes in Indochina, Malaya and 
Indonesia, generally more exotic than practical, included kapok and pineapple 
leaves, banana and fan palm plants and sisal hemp fi bres.34  The bark of fi brous 
trees provided the material for clothing in parts of rural Indonesia and was 
used in that country’s Bakken province to make rope.35  Sheet rubber was 
adapted as sarongs for some Indonesian women.36  In mountain Java, people 
clothed themselves in old tyre tubing.37  Even so, it was not uncommon for 
people in rural areas to go naked for want of clothing.  In Malaya, Japanese 
fi rms manufactured clothing and blankets for the military from rags and waste 
materials.  Discarded cigarette butts yielded the raw ingredient to produce a 





While a passable substitute for toilet paper proved a challenge, writing and 
other types of papers were a less difficult proposition.  Paper was variously 
produced from slang grass, rice husk or coconut husk (South Borneo), pineapple 
fibre or bamboo (Malaya) and straw or sometimes cotton and rice stalks 
(Indonesia).39  Japanese in Malaya made paper from locally collected waste 
paper.40  Coconut husk waste yielded a form of cardboard in the Philippines.41
In war economies, labour and raw materials often substitute for capital, 
as is evident from a number of the substitutions already described.  In some 
instances, however, the extremity of substitution, encouraged by cheap labour 
and Japanese access to unlimited currency, was notable.  Although constrained 
by a shortage of production materials, the Japanese nevertheless pushed ahead 
with tyre-manufacturing in Thailand.  In June 1944, it required 14 days for four 
workers to produce one solid rubber tyre; the manufacture of four tyres a day 
would use 14 tons of rubber.42
While garments had to be mended until they literally fell apart, cotton 
thread was hard to obtain.  Plant fi bres afforded one thread substitute and also 
had several other uses.  In Singapore, the fi bres of pineapple plants were used 
to make fi shing nets, belt conveyor hoses and tyres.  The fi bres were extracted, 
in a process remarkable for its highly labour-intensity, by women scraping the 
pineapple leaves with small knives.  A woman could glean just four to five 
ounces of fi bre a day.  It was estimated that Malaya could produce 2,000 tons of 
fi bre a year by employing 36,000 female workers and using 250,000 pineapples 
daily.43  In Pontianak, rope was made from pineapple fi bres.44
Soap could be made with many possible ingredients.  Coconut oil was 
perhaps the most usual.  It was mixed with mangrove ash in Borneo.45   In the 
Philippines, where thousands of small Chinese soap manufacturers appeared, 




Substitutes for medicines were a particular stumbling block.  In Selangor in 
Malaya and also in Indonesia, rubber oil mixed with kerosene was sprayed on 
mosquito breeding areas in the hope of reducing the need for quinine as an anti- 
malarial agent.47  Aristonius copris substituted for quinine in the Philippines.48 
People in Singapore produced shark oil to provide, as a dietary supplement, a 
sort of medicine.49  Japanese medical research in Malaya found that tinctures 
could be extracted from a local shrub.50  The basis for vitamin B and C pills 
was extracted from rice bran and tangerines in Indonesia.51  However, in the 
Philippines, starch manufactured into aspirin tables was nevertheless labelled 
by local sellers as diyenwain pronounced ‘gen you wine’ in Tagalog and an 
alliterative play on ‘genuine’.52  In 1944, Burma’s government, after concluding 
that the country must turn increasingly towards indigenous cures, set up a 
committee and engaged Japanese experts to study Burmese medical roots and 
herbs.53  Lacking medicine, the population of Borneo increasingly resorted to 
appealing to medicine men and the spirits.54
Conclusion
Looking back, a high-ranking Japanese offi cial tried to explain reasons for 
acute World War II shortages, or in a number of instances the unavailability, of 
many basic manufactured goods and the diffi culties in starting local production. 
He refl ected that: ‘I really only understood the nature of a colonial economy, 
and how different it is from an independent national economy [after I came to] 
Indonesia, where there was not even a single ironworks, chemical factory, or 
carbide factory, and even the necessary technology and attendant facilities such 
as electricity, radio communications and medicine production were lacking’.55




specialized economic development to the exclusion of even many essential 
goods, import substituting industrialization might be unrealistic, necessity and 
high and escalating prices for absent or hard-to-obtain goods nevertheless led to 
attempts to devise some manner of substitutes.  This article has drawn attention 
to a few of the many, often seemingly unlikely, substitutes that emerged in 
Southeast Asia.  Often these substitutes were, as the article has shown, rather 
imperfect.  Nor, since substitution alone could not have sustained those in 
Southeast Asia, was it the whole story for the Southeast Asian consumer 
economy.
While substitution efforts were largely a market response to shortages, 
rationing was necessary as a government response.  During the war it 
functioned as a principal means of regulating the distribution of numerous basic 
consumer goods.  Substitution was, to some extent, a palliative to wartime 
shortages.  Rationing was essential if those in charge in Southeast Asia were to 
try to provide all Southeast Asians with at least a minimum standard of living 
and preserve civil order.
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